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This paper deals with private profits of corporate control and answers the following 
2 questions. Firstly, what are the determinants that affect the private profits of corporate 
control under Chinese special institutional background? Secondly, what are the economic 
consequences of private profits of corporate control? 
The first part of this paper introduces the related research theories, some basics of 
private profits of corporate control and gives a brief review and comment on related lite-
rature. Then, using a sample of listed companies that had both the controlling block and 
the non-controlling block within same year from 1997-2003, I evaluate the overall level 
of private profits of control of Chinese listed companies from two aspects: on the one 
hand, to estimate shared profits of control right with the help of transfer price of 
non-controlling block; on the other, to evaluate the private profits of control base on the 
transfer price difference between the controlling block and the non-controlling block of a 
company. Thirdly, I have an empirical analysis on determinants of Chinese private profits 
of control right. Furthermore, the value of the sample company is evaluated by its 3-year 
unusual accumulated monthly return after control right transfer. Research found that pri-
vate profits of corporate control and company value creation are of negative relationship. 
The final part of this paper summarizes the main research findings of this research and 
proposes suggestion for improving the legal protection system for the listed companies, 
constructing effective control right market and perfecting the governing system.  
The innovation of this research lies in the improvement on the model of private 
benefit of corporate control. The use of transfer premium of control to evaluate the pri-
vate profits of corporate control is more direct and accurate. And a theoretical and em-
pirical study on the relationship between private profits of corporate control and compa-
ny value creation are another contribution of this paper since there is little literature 
found on this issue.  
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① Berly, A. and  G.Means. The Modern Corporation and Private Property[M].Macmillan.1932. 
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理问题即所有权和经营权分离条件下的代理问题，更要关注和应对大股东与小股东
之间的利益冲突带来新的代理问题。可喜的是，随着控制权和控制权私人利益概念




















行的认识，开创了“企业的契约理论”(the contracyual theory of the firm)，后随着
Alchian and Demsetz、Williamson、Grossman and Hart、Hartand Moore 等学者从不同
的角度论证了契约的不完全性及其相机治理等，从而得以发扬光大。这一理论可以
用如下三句话来概括①： ①企业的契约性(the contractual nature of the firm)； ②契约
                                                        













第一章  导论 
- 3 - 
的不完备性(或不完全性)(the incompleteness of the contracts)； ③以及由此导致的所



























                                                        





































和私人利益（Private benefits），Grossman 和 Hart（1980，1988）②证明了控制权共
享利益和私人利益的存在。那么什么是控制权共享利益和控制权私人利益呢？ 
控制权的共享利益来自于控股股东的决策权利和监督效应。Shleifer 和 Vishny
                                                        
① Jensen M， Meckling W. Theory of Firm: Managerial Behavior， Agency Costs， and Ownership Structure .Journal 
of Financial Economics， 1976，34， 3(4) :305-360 . 
② Grossman S， Hart O. Takeover Bids， the Free Rider Problem， and the Theory of the Corporation [J]. Bell Journal 
of Economics， 1980， 11(1): 42~69. Grossman S， Hart， O. One Share –One Vote and the Market for Corporate 
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如 La Porta 等（1999）③所说的在很多国家的大公司中最主要的代理问题不是 Jensen
和 Meckling（1976）所证明的股东和管理者的冲突，而是大股东和小股东的代理问
题。 
                                                        
① Shleifer A, Vishny R. A Survey of Corporate Governance [J]. Journal of Finance, 1987, 52(2): 737~783 
② Johson S,La Porta R, Lopez-de-Silanes F, Shleifer A．Tunneling [J]. American Economic Review, 2000, 90(2): 
22~27. 
③  La Porta R, Lopez-de-Silanes F, Shleifer A. Corporate Ownership around in the World [J]. Journal of Finance， 























金的现象，被占用资金合计高达 966.69 亿元，超过 2002 年市场一年的首发新股融
资额度 560 亿元。而 2002 年全年，全部上市公司通过证券市场融资总额仅为 761.75














后，又陆续爆发了“华北制药”、“莲花味精”、 “*ST 珠峰”、“*ST 江纸”等欠款
大案，大股东侵占上市公司资金可以说是“前仆后继”。 
2003 年每股亏损高达 2.844 元的“*ST 江纸”就是大股东占款的典型牺牲品。
该公司 2003 年亏损 4.58 亿元，加上公司 2001 年和 2002 年亏损的 2.99 亿元和 3.32
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亿元，三年累计亏损额高达 10.89 亿元。年报显示，“*ST 江纸”三年巨亏完全缘于
巨额资金被大股东占用。“*ST 江纸”只得对这笔欠款计提坏账准备。2001 年，“*ST
江纸”计提了应收款坏账准备 2.61 亿元；2002 年，“*ST 江纸”被占用的资金增加
到 10.03 亿元，公司相应计提了应收款坏账准备 2.28 亿元；2003 年被占用资金仍高











原名大连北大车行股份有限公司，1999 年之前业绩一直稳健。1999 年 3 月，厦门
































不到两年的时间内“长江控股”的担保金额已经超过了 2001 年底其净资产的 140%。 
证券市场曾引爆过不少的“担保地雷”。例如“ST 幸福”、“ST 九州”、“ST 海
洋”等。而在 2003 年，最大的担保圈莫过于“ST 啤酒花”的担保圈，该公司自身
也因为处于担保圈的核心而亏损 12.15 亿元，每股净亏损 3.304 元。年报显示，截
止到 2003 年 12 月 31 日，公司及控股子公司对外担保累计 18.57 亿元，其中属于应
披露的大股东及关联方占用公司的资金金额为 1.69 亿元。公司在 2003 年度计提了
9.51 亿元的关联费用，比上年增加了 9.02 亿元，营业外支出达 5.38 亿元，较上年













1978-1982 年 63 宗超过 5%比例的股权交易进行研究，发现成交价大大高于股权交
易宣布后的价格，平均溢价约为 20%。Dyck 和 Zingles(2004)研究了 1999-2000 年发
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